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Abstract: When Soviet Union collapsed, there were different hypothesis regarding democratic re-
forms and political system changes in Kyrgyzstan. It was believed that Kyrgyzstan would develop its 
independent policy and democratic governance. Since early 1990s European countries through OSCE, 
and later through the EU launched development projects have been playing central role in democracy 
promotion and civil society development in Central Asia. At the same time, as analysis show geopoliti-
cal interests of neighboring powerful states such as Russia and China increased in the region, which re-
sulted the creation of regional institutions such as Shanhai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Collective 
Security Organization (CSO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Silk Road Belt Initiative (SRBI). 
While being the fully-fledged member of China and Russia led regional institutions, Kyrgyzstan is un-
der heavy political and economic influence. Besides, human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan like in other 
Central Asian countries has been deteriorating for last few years.
 Thus, the research paper focuses on interplay between Russia and China for geopolitical dominance 
in the region, including how it negatively influences for political volatility, civil society suppression and 
deterioration of human rights issues. Paper equally analyzes European countries engagement in human 
rights and democracy promotion in Kyrgyzstan. The research considers important to analyze the EU 
strategy in democratic reforms in Central Asia and to investigate why it matters for the EU.
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Introduction and aim
When Soviet Union collapsed, there were different hypothesis regarding democratic reforms and political system changes in Central Asia. If a certain number of schol-
ars argued that the fall of communism would bring the development of political parties, 
party pluralism accompanied by democratic reforms and active political participation, 
there were also local experts and scholars who predicted interplay between Russia and 
China for economic expansion and regional stability will sway over western influence 
regionally.
Upon independence, with active engagement of international organizations and re-
gional institutions all five countries introduced liberal measures in economic sector and 
political system. However, none of the CA states integrated democratic values in political 
system. On the contrary, Central Asian leaders reshaped their post-soviet authoritarian 
regime with the support of neighboring major powers. Today, after 25 years of Central 
Asian countries independence, “all Central Asian states embrace nondemocratic rule, 
variously labeled as personal dictatorships, authoritarian presidentialisms, and neopatri-
monial and sultanistic regimes” (Omelicheva, 2015, p. 1).
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Analysis of the post soviet period clearly shows that the European Union, OSCE 
and USAID launched development projects in Central Asia had a promising role in pro-
moting the Western approach1 of civil society development and political participation 
process. With the fully-fledged membership of Central Asian states in OSCE and part-
nership and cooperation agreement (PCA2) between the EU and Central Asian countries, 
there was a hope for political system changes in the post-Soviet region, which suffered 
from 70 years of severe suppression of civil society sector. However, as UN reports on 
human rights issues and OSCE reports on the Human Dimension Implementation for the 
year 2016 indicate, Central Asia has been identified as a highly problematic region due 
to human rights violations and suppression of non-state actors in the region.
According to Human Rights Watch’s world report for 2016, “The governments of Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan arrested and imprisoned 
government critics, closed down independent groups and opposition parties, and adopted 
legislation restricting the rights of nongovernmental organizations,”3 which questions 
why two decade investment of western launched projects (particularly the EU’s human 
rights and democracy path) have been unable to improve Central Asia’s record in human 
rights and freedom of speech? What are secrets of Central Asian leaders to sustain their 
undemocratic regime?
According to human rights activists and social scientists, human rights violations 
and civil society crackdown in the post Soviet Central Asia to some extend is directly 
connected with regime survival attempt of former Communist leaders of Central Asia. 
Political leadership in Central Asia differs from Central and Eastern Europe as well as 
from other Former Soviet countries. As two and half decade period of the post soviet 
shows, all Central Asian presidents established super presidential form of governance 
which is based on clan and tribal policy in addition to family centered regimes. Besides, 
all leaders of Central Asia suppress civil society and free media.
If some scholars connect the unsuccessful political system changes with the seventy-
year-old communist style of governance, which is deep rooted in the government leaders 
of Central Asia, a certain number of scholars refer to the geographical location of Central 
Asia, which is surrounded by two historical overlords – China and Russia. As analysis 
show geopolitical interests of neighboring Russia and China has increased in the region, 
resulting the creation of regional institutions such as Shanhai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), Collective Security Organization (CSO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and 
Silk Road Belt Initiative (SRBI).
In this respect, while analyzing deterioration of human rights issues and failure of 
democratic reforms in the post-Soviet Central Asia, the research paper considers impor-
1 Western approach in this context implies to western version of civil society which is associated 
with democracy promotion and human rights values. For last two decades US State Department funded 
projects of Counterpart International, Civil Society Support Centers and EU funded projects in Central 
Asia aimed at activating civil society and democracy promotion through activities of non-state actors, 
which pursue promotion of democracy, human rights, rule of law.
2 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is a document signed between the EU and Central Asian 
states in 1996 which paved the way for a broader bilateral relationship, encompassing political dia-
logue; trade in goods; business and investment.
3 HRW World report for 2016, retrieved on March 9, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/
central-asia-backsliding-rights.
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tant to study not only the Central Asian leaders priority to regime survival but also the 
revived interest of Russia and China for geopolitical dominance in the region, at a time 
when local regimes become less hospitable to western launched democracy promotion 
projects. In order to narrow down the research, this paper focuses on the post Soviet Kyr-
gyzstan, which started to face human rights violation and political volatility for last few 
years. According to freedom House report on nation in transition “Democracy score of 
Kyrgyzstan in comparison with 2016 has declined, having reached 6 points (5.89 points 
a year before). As a result, the republic has moved to the category of countries with con-
solidated authoritarian regime” (Khokhlova, 2017, p. 1).
In this respect, paper investigates democracy promotion in Kyrgyzstan, including 
civil society sector. It equally examines the European Union’s (EU) democracy pro-
motion efforts in the post-Soviet Central Asia, focusing on the case of the Kyrgyz Re-
public, which accommodates relatively active civil society in the region and the same 
time identified by experts as one of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries 
in the post-Soviet space. Finally, research also includes the latest regional initiative 
developments led by Russia and China, and its impact for authoritarianism revival in 
Kyrgyzstan.
Political system and leadership in the Post Soviet Central Asia
It is argued that the seventy-year-old communist style of governance inherited weak 
civil society in Central Asia, which negatively influence for democratic reforms and 
political system change in the region. In this regard, Mehrad Haghayeghi pointed out 
that “although in some republics independence brought about major structural changes 
that aimed at altering the institutional frameworks of politics, with the exception of Kyr-
gyzstan, power remained in the hands of the former communist leaders who so far have 
hindered the process of post-communist democratization” (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 121). 
By most scholars view, soviet political culture is deep rooted in government structures of 
Central Asian states and it has direct link to the failure of political transformation.
With the dissolution of the USSR, former Soviet leaders from the Central Commit-
tee took presidential offices in young countries and reshaped their political ideology. 
For example, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan aimed at preserving Soviet-era institutions 
such as kolkhoz, sovkhoz and the one-party system, while Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan integrated clan and tribal networks for political participation. If Nursultan 
Nazarbayev has been serving as the first and only president in Kazakhstan, the Uzbek 
president Islam Karimov, whose regime shared Joseph Stalin’s style of rule, served 
25 years before his death. Like during Soviet times, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cen-
tralized the decision-making process of social, political and economic issues, whereby 
the civil society sector remained under severe suppression. Moreover, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan have been criticized for the heavy control of media as well as the NGO 
sector while other three Central Asian countries have been also criticized for crackdown 
in civil society sector.
What is characteristic to power structure in the post Soviet Central Asia is that presi-
dents have been creating super presidential model of governance, accompanied by fam-
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ily structure and clan and tribal networks in business and political spheres. Most experts 
criticize not only usurpation of power by Central Asian presidents but also tendency 
to treat their country’s economy as a family business (Orozbekova, 2016, p. 1). In her 
analysis of post-Soviet Central Asian countries, Anna Matveeva argues “Central Asian 
institutions resemble their Soviet predecessors, but power arrangements within them are 
different. These are ‘hybrid institutions’ which are a product of the adaptation of their 
Soviet predecessors to post-Soviet realities and in which rules are typically blurred” 
(Matveeva, 2006, p. 15). In this context, Central Asian countries replaced the status of 
president with the role of Khan or Sultan. Like in the period of the Kokand Kingdom, 
Central Asian presidents gained absolute power.
If during Soviet times the communist party was monopolizing the political and 
economic structure, after independence Central Asian society was confronted with the 
usurpation of business and political power by one family or clan. Family members of 
presidents including their clan and tribal network members take high state positions and 
actively control business and private sector. For instance, “in Tajikistan, president tapped 
his daughter Ozoda Rahmon to head the presidential administration while her husband 
has been working as deputy head of Tajikistan’s central bank” (Orozbekova, 2016, p. 1). 
In the case of Kazakhstan it is argued that “At age 75, Nazarbayev exercises tight cen-
tralized control over the government, and his family plays a key role in maintaining 
power. For years, high oil prices made it easy for the Kazakh president to divide author-
ity among his family and supporters” (Stratfor, 2015, p. 1).
Without exception all Central Asian business and political structures can be charac-
terized as highly family centered. In addition to this, the term elite also has a popular 
topicality in the power structure of Central Asian countries. There are certain elite groups 
such as former Communist leaders’ families or clan leaders, who actively participate in 
monopolization of business and political system. For instance, even in Kyrgyzstan after 
two revolutions which pursued goal to replace corrupted family and its circle, politi-
cal system and business sector is still dominated by people from the circle of previous 
presidents.
The next issue to discuss on civil society crackdown in Central Asia is connected 
with the government and media relations. In Western society, mass media is perceived 
as an important tool for achieving the main objectives of democracy promotion and civil 
society development. However, in authoritarian countries of Central Asia free media is 
perceived as direct threat to their regime survival. Regarding media relations in Central 
Asian governments, it is assumed that “the Soviet Union left behind a mixed legacy in the 
media industry in Central Asia and the other new independent states in its former territory. 
On the one hand, the mass media were part of the ideological ‘superstructure’ of the socie-
ties. They were foremost an instrument of political command and control” (International 
Media Support, Copenhagen, 2008, p. 14). Indisputably, Soviet era media policy is deep 
rooted in government policy of Central Asia. However, it is equally important to take into 
account the fact that contemporary media, which is equipped with technological innovation 
and which can influence mass movements (such as in the Arab Spring), is a high concern 
for the quasi-democratic and authoritarian governments of Central Asia. Free media is per-
ceived as a threat for governmental politics. Free media brings independent movements, 
and independent view, which in most cases are not in favour of Central Asian dictators. 
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Therefore, when one discusses about democracy promotion and civil society development 
in the post-Soviet Central Asia, it encompasses confrontation between western democratic 
values and family centered regime.
Former communist leaders and dictators of the region sustain their regime through 
demonizing western values and describing it as negative external other. In this context, 
for the western countries it is getting more complicated to engage in liberalizing political 
and economic system. The last two and half decade investment still did not show visible 
results, in particular in political power system change.
Regional cooperation in Central Asia
Central Asia is defined as one of the most problematic regions not only due to human 
rights violations and undemocratic regimes which suppress civil society but also its fra-
gility to high unemployment and poverty increase its vulnerability to contemporary chal-
lenges such as Islamic radicalism, terrorism, drug trafficking, ethnic violence and other 
forms of complex emergencies, which require regional response. Besides, three of the 
Central Asian countries are bordered with Afghanistan whereas situation in Afghanistan 
directly influences the stability in the region.
When one analyzes regional integration policy, Central Asian states became mem-
bers of several regional institutions or initiatives led by Russia or China. For last two 
and half decades period Central Asian states joined to regional institutions such as 
Shanhai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Collective Security Organization (CSO), 
Eurasian Economic Union and Great Silk Road Belt initiative, which highlights Cen-
tral Asia’s importance for Chinese and Russian economy and development. By social 
experts view cheap and reliable energy is considered as one of the main driving force 
for increased geopolitical interest and interplay between China and Russia. In this 
regard Virginia Marantidou and Ralph A. Cossa stated “China have been investing bil-
lions of dollars in the energy sector (which include a series of contracts with Central 
Asian states while Moscow is especially keen to maintain control of Central Asian 
energy and resource exports to protect its own position in the market” (Marantidou, 
Cossa, 2014, p. 1).
Development of regional organizations with Russia and China in Central Asia shows 
not only increased interests of historical overlords in the region but also their competi-
tion for economic expansion and regional dominance. The latest statistics and reports 
clearly show how Chinese trade with Central Asian region has been exceeding Russian 
economic turnover with Central Asian countries. In 2015, “China became Uzbekistan’s 
largest trading partner with $3 billion worth of trade, Kazakhstan’s largest investor with 
33 deals delivering $23.6 billion to the nation and Turkmenistan’s biggest investor in 
energy sector. In addition, China became a leading partner in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
for hydro-power projects” (Kelly-Clark, 2015, p. 1).
While analyzing current regional integration process in the region it can be con-
cluded that Central Asian states see China and Russia led organizations as an oppor-
tunity for balancing their alliances- two major players, both of which have greater 
ambition to economic and political dominance in the region. In the process of re-
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gional intensifications in the frame of Eurasian Economic Union or Great Silk Road 
initiative, one can also see how these two regional rivals and major players impose 
new import restrictions in their led regional institutions which focus on increasing 
dependency of Central Asian states. For instance, Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 
which is seen as Moscow’s counter response to Beijin’s great Silk Road plan that 
aim at extending China’s zone of economic interest in the region, offers opportunity 
to Moscow to tie economic interdependence of Central Asian countries with Russia. 
Moreover, since 2014 with the eruption of Ukrainian crisis and with the active en-
gagement of Russia in Syrian conflict, Russia regained its role as security guarantor 
in the region.
At the same time, local experts also draw attention to shared interests of Russia and 
China in the region. Both powers have common interest in maintaining regional security 
which is complicated due to increasing religiosity and development of radical groupings 
in post-Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Xinjiang region. Since Central Asia obtained 
independences, number of radical groups and sects such as Hisbut Tahrir, Islamic Move-
ment of Uzbekistan, Turkestan movement, Tabligi Jamoat and others have increased. 
Central Asian states as well as Russia and China acknowledge that without regional co-
operation it would be impossible to address security challenges in the region. Therefore, 
when one investigates Shanghai cooperation organization and Collective Security Treaty 
organization, both of these institutions are security oriented.
Most scholars highlight that the role of regional institutions will be vital to solve secu-
rity challenges and address contemporary issues. Membership of Central Asian countries 
in Russian and China led regional institutions plays a crucial role to extend economic 
growth and to confront drug trafficking, terrorism, Islamic radicalism and to secure re-
gional stability. However, when one analyzes main root causes of high unemployment 
and poverty which increase fragility of Central Asian society to Islamic radicalism, drug 
trafficking and organized crime, it is tightly connected with high corruption and weak 
civil society which is suppressed.
A certain number of local experts do not prioritize corruption and civil society crack-
down as major issue for the region. By their opinion if economy will develop and po-
litical system will be stable corruption, poverty and unemployment will be also solved 
gradually. In other words in regional integration process in the frame of Russia and Chi-
na led organizations civil society is lagging behind. Neither Russia nor China care about 
human rights violations in Central Asia for the sake of their alliance and dominance in 
the region. Besides, neither Russia nor China accommodates open civil society and free 
media. Hence, both regional players are not interested in civil society development and 
democracy promotion in the region. Therefore, it would be relevant to ask what is the 
future of democracy and civil society development in the post-Soviet Central Asia? And 
what is the role of the EU and other western countries in promoting democracy in the 
region?
In this regard, scholars assess “the EU’s engagement in Central Asia is one of limited 
to no impact. The region has become more unstable; democracy is seen by the regimes 
as a threat to their survival; and human rights have been backsliding” (Boonstra, 2015, 
p. 1). The latest reports of OSCE and HRW show that Central Asian leaders have less 
interest in engaging in human rights and democracy discourses.
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The EU engagement in democracy promotion beyond the Europe
The contemporary understanding of democracy promotion, which includes the issue 
of active civil society, political and civic participation and the active involvement of 
non-state actors in social and public issues, derives from the Western countries. The EU, 
which was established by principles of democracy and western values, is a key player in 
democracy promotion and civil society development in and beyond the Europe. Demo-
cratic values are integral part of the EU strategy and since the fall of communism the 
nature of EU external policy have been encompassing democracy assistance in global 
context.
Pavol Demeš, Director for Central and Eastern Europe, German Marshall Fund 
of the United States stated “once the Iron Curtain was dismantled and CEE coun-
tries opened up to pluralistic democracy, multiple public and private players from the 
West started assisting them” (Demeš, 2010, p. 5). Since the crackdown of the USSR, 
institutional intensification and enlargement process had powerful impact for democ-
ratization, liberalization, formal institution building, and law enforcement in post-
communist block space. It is argued that for Central and Eastern European countries, 
which shared a certain degree of common cultural value with the West, was relatively 
smoother to transform for democratic governance than in Balkan or former Soviet 
Union countries.
There are several tools and mechanisms used by the EU in promoting democracy. 
One of them has direct linkage with the EU enlargement. The EU accession requirement 
or so called Copenhagen criteria also played a crucial role for successful democratic re-
forms in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, “the policy of conditionality and open 
doors, associated with foreign assistance, helped Eastern European countries to navigate 
the transformation and integration processes” (Demeš, 2010, p. 6).
What the vast majority of scholars argue is that the EU integration process has 
been perceived as the most encouraging instrument for democratic reform processes 
of candidate and non-member states in the EU’s neighborhood. Thus, the EU enlarge-
ment has a vital stake to set the adoption of democratic rules and practices as condi-
tions for integration process. This mechanism by most scholars is coined as political 
conditionality.
However, this political conditionality instrument of the EU is applicable only to po-
tential members and candidate states. Therefore, while analyzing the EU engagement 
in democracy promotion beyond Europe, one would ask questions such as what mecha-
nisms and instruments are applied to promote democracy and western values? And how 
the EU can effectively engage in democracy promotion in other regions where other 
regional powers have more influential mechanisms from security stability, economic 
growth and other context. For instance, in the case of the post soviet Central Asia, the EU 
has been actively engaged in democracy promotion through Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreement signed by the EU and Central Asian countries.
In contrast to the Eastern and Central Europe, Central Asia is far from Brussels 
and the membership or enlargement instrument is not applicable to the region. There-
fore, in the case of Central Asia one can examine the EU engagement in democracy 
assistance without political conditionality. Moreover, other regional players, Russia 
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and China regained their influence in the region and created their regional institutions 
which allowed them to develop their own mechanism and instruments for integration 
process. According the latest estimates, China has remained the main economic part-
ner of Kyrgyzstan.
Table 1
Foreign direct investment to Kyrgyzstan by China
China The rest of countries
Foreign direct investment to Kyrgyzstan in 2005  45 million
Foreign Direct investment to Kyrgyzstan for 2014 108 million 103 million
Foreign direct investment stock to Kyrgyzstan in 2015 984 million
Source: Tabaldieva, 2017.
As table above shows the total amount of foreign direct investment inflows to Kyr-
gyzstan increased almost ten times from 2014 to 2015. If one compares foreign direct 
investment inflows to Kyrgyzstan between 2005 and 2015, for ten years period increased 
20 times. As for trade turnover between the two countries, in 2015 it reached over $1.1 
billion which is the highest comparing to Kyrgyzstan trade turnover with other neighbor-
ing countries. Some projects under cooperation between the two countries are as follows: 
“Kyrgyzstan China gas pipeline, the second stage of North South highway, reconstruc-
tion and repair of roads in Bishkek, construction of the oil refinery in the country, mod-
ernization of the Bishkek Power Station” (Tabaldieva, 2017, p. 1).
The EU engagement in post Soviet Central Asia
With the dissolution of the USSR social scientists raised questions such as “What 
should be the form of government for the newly born countries, and what were the ap-
propriate institutional mechanisms for making and implementing policies while also 
ensuring regime survival?” (Menon, 2007, p. 3). On the first hand, the fall of com-
munism opened promising challenges for the development of democratic and liberal 
political systems in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in post-Soviet territory. 
However, when one compares Eastern European countries with Central Asia, as Greg-
ory Gleason argues “all Central Asian countries did not fight for their independence” 
(Gleason, 1997, p. 32) and in 1990s they all inherited with the Soviet political culture, 
whereas the NGO sector played a key role for regime changes movements in Central 
and Eastern Europe.
When western countries launched their democracy promotion and development proj-
ects in the region, it was expected that former soviet states might be able to make re-
forms in their economic and political system and transform into European-style market 
economies. Scholars also argued that successful democratic reforms of Eastern Europe 
could prove a model for Central Asia. However, after 25 years of independence, Central 
Asian countries are still headed by former communist leaders and there is no political 
space for opposition.
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What is characteristic to the post soviet Central Asia is that local regimes managed 
to retain their suppressive policies. Since the 1990s the number of political parties and 
factions increased in the region but it did not bring democratic elections. Opposition 
parties and factions exist symbolically and opposition leaders and human rights activists 
who are against the regime are in political asylum. Within this regards, one would ask 
what went wrong with the western launched projects in the EU neighborhood Central 
Asia? By some scholars view, before September 11 the EU and USA were not proactive 
enough in promoting either political or economic reform in the region. Martha Brill Ol-
cott emphasized “supporting reform in Central Asia was neither a priority of the U.S. nor 
of Europe, and in most ways policy in this region became a hand-maiden of the policy 
toward Russia” (Olott, 2007, p. 1).
Mehrad Haghayeghi pointed out that “although in some republics independence 
brought about major structural changes that aimed at altering the institutional frame-
works of politics, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, power remained in the hands of 
the former communist leaders who so far have hindered the process of post-communist 
democratization” (Haghayeghi, 1996, p. 121). It can be explained with the fact that new 
independent Central Asian states inherited communist parties and communist leaders, 
whereby political transformation appeared unsuccessful.
With the dissolution of the USSR, former Soviet leaders from the Central Commit-
tee took presidential offices in young countries and reshaped their political ideology. 
For example, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan aimed at preserving Soviet-era institutions 
such as kolkhoz, sovkhoz and the one-party system, while Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan still see democracy as a threat to their existence. Thus, it would be inter-
esting to analyze, what is the role of the EU engagement in democracy promotion in 
the region with the increased geopolitical interest of Russia and China in post Soviet 
Central Asia.
The case of Kyrgyzstan
In their analysis Nicklass Norling and Svante Kornel highlighted “Kyrgyzstan is the 
most democratic of the Central Asian countries and is often classified as a hybrid regime, 
combining democratic and authoritarian elements” (Norling, Kornel, 2016, p. 4). Among 
Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan differs with its active civil society. As local and 
international experts highlight Kyrgyzstan is the first Central Asian country, which have 
been experiencing civil society revival through mass movements and massive protests. 
For last two and half decade, Kyrgyz society already experienced two revolutions, which 
resulted withdrawal of authoritarian leaders.
From the early 1990s, the first president of the Kyrgyz Republic Askar Akaev had 
a different approach than other Central Asian presidents. His main slogan ‘Kyrgyz-
stan is our common home’ pursued the prevention of conflict in multiethnic Kyrgyz 
society and the same time this slogan had democratic meaning for diverse society. 
Askar Akaev’s democratic and liberal view in early 1990s drove Kyrgyzstan for ac-
tive involvement in international society through membership in international orga-
nizations.
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According to the assessment of ‘International Crisis Group’,4 in the first decade af-
ter independence, Kyrgyzstan was described as an island of democracy and stability in 
Central Asia. The Crisis Group highlighted that “in comparison with other countries in 
the region, it has indeed carried out deeper economic reforms and allowed more room for 
civil society and opposition political activity” (ICG report, 2001, p. 1). In contrast to oth-
er Central Asian countries, Kyrgyz society could preserve the active political participa-
tion of ordinary citizens. In contrast to other Central Asian countries, numbers of NGOs 
in Kyrgyzstan have been constantly increasing and Kyrgyzstan became the first Central 
Asian country which has experienced the revival of the civil society sector through the 
involvement of the NGO sector. Therefore, when one compares democratic reforms in 
Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan has been described as the island of democracy due 
to an active civil society.
However, the model which was promoted by Askar Akaev failed to work due to 
economic fragility and heavy corruption in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, like in other Cen-
tral Asian countries, family centered regime in Kyrgyzstan was one of the main root 
causes of protests. The president’s family involvement in corruption and monopoliza-
tion of the political and economic sector brought the failure of democracy promotion 
in Kyrgyzstan.
As most scholars argue Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 “Tulip” revolution brought some hope 
for political system change. However, due to the strengthening of family centered re-
gime by Bakiev, Kyrgyzstan witnessed the second revolution that took place in April 
2010 and resulted death of 87 people and injured over 1500 people, civil society is still 
struggling with freedom of speech and democracy promotion. Regarding the post April 
2010, Kathleen Collins suggested to “Kyrgyzstani and international proponents of de-
mocracy direct their focus beyond elections to seriously addressing the potentially 
devastating challenges of corruption and governance, ethno-nationalism and ethnic 
instability, and the need for a citizenry committed to the new democracy” (Collins, 
2012, p. 1). The case of two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan that has removed two authori-
tarian presidents demonstrates people attempt to change political system corrupted by 
family and clan politics.
In general context, comparing to other Central Asian states till last year Kyrgyzstan 
was identified as the quasi-democratic and with some elements of authoritarianism. How-
ever, already in February 2017 Freedom house and Human Rights Watch listed Kyrgyzstan 
together with all Central Asian countries as consolidated authoritarian regime. If several 
years back Kyrgyzstan was identified as an island of democracy in Central Asia with rela-
tively active civil society in the region, for last few years the Kyrgyz government is also 
becoming intolerant to criticism and suppressive towards political opponents and human 
rights activists. Besides, journalists and human rights activists who reflected independent 
view and criticized presidents suppressive policy towards opposition are intimidated my 
presidents lawsuits. For instance, from March to April 2017 “the prosecutor general has 
4 Crisis Group is an International NGO which was founded in 1995 on the initiative of well-known 
transatlantic figures who dispared at the international community’s failure to anticipate and respond 
effectively to the tragedies in the early 1990s in Balkans and Africa, information about the vision and 
mission statement of the organization is retrieved from NGO website: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
about.aspx.
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demanded 20 million soms (285.000 US dollars) from Taalaigul Toktakunova, a lawyer for 
the opposition Ata Meken party and Radio Azattyk, and three million soms (43,000 dollars) 
from other defendants including the Zanoza.kg, and 24.kg websites” (IWPR Central Asia, 
2017, p. 1). Intimidation of Kyrgyz media by president’s lawsuits and the recent arrest 
of Parliamentarian and opposition leader Omurbek Tekebaev on February 26, 2017, and 
accusations towards his follow party members and members of Jogorju Kengesh/Kyrgyz 
Parliament Almambet Shykmamatov and Aida Salyanova indicates political motivation of 
charges and revival of authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan.
The EU strategy for Kyrgyzstan
The EU strategy to Kyrgyzstan, like to other Central Asian countries, have been in 
constant evolution since 1990s. If Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) since 
1999 provided the legal framework for EU – Kyrgyz Republic cooperation that focused 
on political dialogue, economic relations and other sectors, including science, technol-
ogy and culture, in 2007 the EU developed New Partnership with Kyrgyzstan which 
further pursued strengthening bilateral partnership.
While analyzing the EU partnership and strategy to Kyrgyzstan, it is important to 
mention about Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP5) for Kyrgyz Republic 2014–
2020 that pursues to consolidating the values of democracy, application of rule of law, 
good governance, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which have 
direct implication to sustainable and prosperous development of Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, 
in the analysis of MIP for Kyrgyz Republic it is clear that the focal sectors of support 
within the MIP 2014–2020 are the Rule of Law, Education and Integrated Rural Devel-
opment. The EU strategy which focuses on neo-liberal approach that aim at strengthen-
ing democracy, human rights issues and application of rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, have 
been directly financed through the EU technical assistance program in the frame of PCA 
and current Multi-annual indicative program. As analysis show comparing to China and 
Russia, the EU focuses on democracy assistance in Kyrgyzstan.
There are scholars who raise questions such as, why democracy progress and human 
rights issue in Kyrgyzstan, which is geographically and geopolitically far from Brus-
sels, matters the EU? and why the EU should care about democracy promotion in Cen-
tral Asian when the region is already under heavy influence of Russia and China? The 
first answer is that European common values such as respect for human rights, freedom 
(including freedom of speech and assembly) the rule of law, justice, solidarity, gender 
equality and other fundamental principles of human rights founded the EU. Democratic 
principles of the EU are seen as centerpiece of engagement not only in its neighborhood 
policy but also in global context.
It is argued that Central Asian regimes see democracy as a threat to their existence 
and are more comfortable with Russian and Chinese support through regional integra-
tion, focusing on political, economic and security context. The lack of interest or passive 
cooperation of Central Asian countries with the EU, by some scholars view derives from 
5 The MIP 2014–2020 allocates € 184 million to the Kyrgyz Republic for the period 2014–2020. In 
comparison with the allocation for 2007–2013 the amount increased by 74%.
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the Central Asian leaders ambition to preserve their family centered regimes and with 
Moscow’s attempt to derail the EU initiatives in the post-Soviet region. The current civil 
society and media crackdown in Kyrgyzstan is also connected not only with president 
Atambaev’s ambition to establish authoritarian regime, but also with the external sup-
port from Russia and China, which do not accommodate open civil society. Both Russia 
and Сhina led regional institutions Shanghais Cooperation organization and Collective 
Security Treaty organization does not give any space for civil society sector. Both of 
these institutions are focused on Security challenges and politico-military cooperation, 
whereas human rights issues, free media and civil society topic is beyond the agenda.
The criticism towards Shanghai cooperation organizations derives from the initial 
goal of China led institution, which aimed at developing good neighborhood policy with 
Central Asia and the same time to control over ethnic minorities Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
tonomous Region (XUAR). When Central Asian states are involved in joint approaches 
of SCO in fighting against terrorism, separatism and extremism, human rights issues 
connected with minorities rights is in threat. It appears as an instrument to control over 
minorities and vulnerable groups.
Conclusion
The EU engagement in Central Asia is only hope for democratic change. Today, 
when Central Asian states are involved in tight cooperation with Russia and China, 
when both historical overlords of the region extended their geopolitical interest, a cer-
tain number of scholars argue that Central Asian states should further strengthen their 
relations with both powerful players in the region, due to Chinese economic growth 
which already is ranked in the first place and due to Russia’s proximity that has re-
turned its status of security guarantor with Russia’s active engagement in Syria. Indis-
putably, regional challenges including security and economic issues can not be solved 
without participation of Russia and China. However, it would be wrong to exclude 
the role of the EU and western countries in Central Asia for stability. Stability and 
development in Central Asia will take place only when illness of economy such as cor-
ruption and family regimes will be eradicated. Regional cooperation of Central Asian 
countries with China and Russia do not consider addressing fights against corruption 
or democratic governance. Therefore, the role of the EU funded projects is crucial to 
civil society development and democracy promotion for Kyrgyzstan as well as to other 
Central Asian countries.
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Zaangażowanie Unii Europejskiej w promocję demokracji w postsowieckiej  
Azji Środkowej: przypadek Republiki Kirgizji – perspektywy i wyzwania
Streszczenie
Po upadku Związku Radzieckiego zrodziły się różne hipotezy dotyczące reform demokratycznych 
i zmian w systemie politycznym w Kirgistanie. Uważano, że Kirgistan rozwinie niezależną politykę 
i demokratyczne rządy. Od początku lat 90. kraje europejskie – najpierw poprzez OBWE, a później 
przez UE – realizowały projekty rozwojowe, odgrywając centralną rolę w promowaniu demokracji 
i rozwoju społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Azji Środkowej. Jednocześnie, jak pokazują analizy, są-
siadujące mocarstwa, takie jak Rosja i Chiny zintensyfikowały realizację swoich interesów geopo-
litycznych w regionie, co zaowocowało powstaniem regionalnych instytucji takich jak Szanghajska 
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Organizacja Współpracy (SCO), Organizacja Bezpieczeństwa Zbiorowego (CSO), Euroazjatycka Unia 
Gospodarcza (EEU) i inicjatywa Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku (SRBI). Będąc pełnoprawnym człon-
kiem instytucji regionalnych, na czele których stoją Chiny i Rosja, Kirgistan znajduje się pod ich sil-
nym wpływem politycznym i gospodarczym. Poza tym, sytuacja w zakresie praw człowieka w Kirgi-
stanie, podobnie jak w innych krajach Azji Środkowej, pogarsza się w ostatnich latach.
Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na wzajemnych relacjach między Rosją i Chinami w zakresie 
dominacji geopolitycznej w regionie, w tym na jej negatywnym wpływie przejawiającym się w nie-
stabilności politycznej, tłumieniu społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i pogorszeniu się sytuacji w zakresie 
praw człowieka. W artykule analizuje się również zaangażowanie krajów europejskich w promowanie 
praw człowieka i demokracji w Kirgistanie. Za istotne uznano przeanalizowanie strategii UE w zakre-
sie reform demokratycznych w Azji Środkowej i zbadanie, dlaczego mają one znaczenie dla UE.
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